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COMMENT
In re Associated Sign & Post, Inc.: The
Affirmative Action Obligations of
Government Contractors in Indiana
INTRODUCTION
When a government tries to promote a public policy through the award
of government contracts, it exercises a classic example of the use of the
carrot and the stick in public policymaking. The government in effect rides
the private sector mule with a carrot in one hand and a stick in the other;
if the government uses the carrot and the stick properly, the mule will
eventually arrive at the desired public policy destination.' In the procurement
process, governments have used the government contract as an incentive to
implement its policies of equal employment opportunity.2 As a government
redefines the scope of a given policy, however, it must also rediscover how
and when to use its incentives to promote the new policy goal.
The Reagan Administration has redefined federal equal employment pol-
icy. In order to implement this new policy, the Administration has proposed
changing Executive Order No. 11,2461 (Executive Order 11,246) and the
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Order.4 This Order outlines the
equal employment obligations of federal government contractors. State and
local governments may also have laws regulating the employment of their
contractors. This Comment will consider the potential significance of the
state and local affirmative action obligations of government contractors in
Indiana in light of the Reagan Administration's new policy. The Comment
will discuss the scope and coverage of Executive Order 11,246 and the current
debate over its continued validity,' outline the affirmative action obligations
of businesses having contracts with either the State of Indidna or munici-
1. The carrot and stick analogy applies when the government does not exercise direct
control over a private party, but rather tries to influence the party's behavior through the
alternative use of incentives and punishments.
2. The procurement process actually involves elements of both the carrot and the stick.
While the award of the government contract is certainly a carrot, the withdrawal of the award,
or any other penalty for noncompliance, is the stick which punishes the contractor for straying
off course. See Morgan, Achieving National Goals Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form
to an Unconstrained Administrative Process, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 301, 303-04.
3. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684
(1966-70 Comp.) Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-70 Comp.), and Exec. Order
12,086, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1978 Comp.), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
4. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.1 to -999.2 (1985).
5. See infra notes 26-68 and accompanying text.
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palities within the state, 6 and finally, analyze the state and local laws in light
of the current debate over the Executive Order.7 Specifically, this Comment
will consider whether these laws contain the same defects that the Reagan
Administration sees in the affirmative action requirements of the Executive
Order. But first, this Comment will examine a recent Indiana case which
illustrates the potential impact of the state and local laws, In re Associated
Sign & Post, Inc.'
I. AN INDIANA CASE CONSIDERING THE AYFnIRMATIVE ACTION
OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
In In re Associated Sign & Post, Inc.,9 a local agency rejected the low
bid for a government contract because the contractor submitted an inadquate
affirmative action plan. The City of Bloomington requires each bidder for
a government contract to submit an affirmative action proposal prior to the
bidding deadline.1I This affirmative action plan must include, among other
things, a racial breakdown of the workforce and a plan for the recruitment
of minorities." In August of 1984, Associated Sign & Post, Inc., submitted
the lowest bid for a contract to provide traffic control signs, signposts, street
name sign brackets and related materials.' 2 Because Associated's bid failed
to contain an adequate affirmative action proposal, the Contract Compliance
Officer for the City of Bloomington declared the bid to be unacceptable. 3
Subsequently, the Board of Public Works awarded the contract to Hall
Signs, Inc., the second lowest bidder for the contract. 4 The Monroe Circuit
Court denied Associated's petition for judicial review of the decision.' 5 On
appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals for the First District held that a
municipality could properly determine that a company was not a "respon-
sible" bidder by virtue of is inadequate affirmative action plan and thereby
reject its low bid for the contract.' 6 The court noted that an awarding body
6. See infra notes 69-93 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
8. 485 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. App. 1985).
9. 485 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. App. 1985).
10. BLOOMINGTON, IND., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2.21.070 (1983).
11. Id.
12. 485 N.E.2d at 919. Associated's bid of $169,457.56 was actually the second lowest bid.
The Board of Public Works disregarded a bid of $146,232.55 on the advice of its consulting
engineers. Id. at 919 n.l.
13. Id. at 919.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 924. The court cited decisions in neighboring jurisdictions which held that the
government can consider a contractor's ability to ensure compliance with antidiscrimination
laws in determining the lowest responsible bidder. See S.N. Neilson v. Public Bldg. Comm'n,
81 111. 2d 290, 299, 410 N.E.2d 40, 44 (1980); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist.,
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has great discretion in its procurement decisions, and that it would reverse
the challenged contract award only where the award was "clearly arbitrary,
corrupt, or fraudulent."' 7
Many businesses in the State of Indiana have government contracts."
These contracts may be with federal, state, or local governments. Moreover,
a business may simultaneously have contracts with more than one level of
government. As a condition to the award of a government contract, each
government may require the contractor to provide equal employment op-
portunity. Each level of government, however, may have different standards
that the contractor must meet to implement its equal employment policy.
The federal government, for example, presently requires the contractor to
undertake an analysis of its labor pool and establish goals and timetables
to remedy the underutilization of women and minorities.19 Indiana, on the
other hand, merely requires the state contractor to include an antidiscri-
mination clause in the contract. 20 As for local governments, the standards
are as varied as the number of local ordinances on the subject. 2' The As-
sociated Sign & Post case exemplifies the wide ranging power that a local
government can have over its contractors.
Of course, many large businesses are not presently concerned with the
state and local laws. A business that has a contract, with the federal gov-
ernment is already subject to the comprehensive affirmative action require-
ments of Executive Order 11,246. If the business complies with the extensive
regulations under the Executive Order, the chances are that it will be in
compliance with the state and local laws as well. Under the Reagan Admin-
istration, however, this Executive Order, and the regulations issued pursuant
to the Order, have come under constant attack.2" The Administration con-
siders the regulations which require government contractors to establish goals
19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 39, 249 N.E.2d 907, 910 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970). See
also Note, Affirmative Action Requirements in Illinois Public Contracts-S.N. Neilsen Company
v. Public Building Commission, 30 DE PAUL L. Rv. 899 (1981).
The court further stated that had Associated been the lowest responsible bidder, Bloomington
could still have rejected the bid for failng to conform to the specifications in the invitation to
bid. 485 N.E.2d at 925. The court noted that Associated's variance from the bid invitation
not only made it an unresponsive bidder, but also gave Associated "a substantial advantage
over both those who were deterred from bidding because of the costs of complying with
affirmative action requirements and those who actually expended time and money in an effort
to meet the invitation's affirmative action specifications." Id.
17. 485 N.E.2d at 923-24.
18. Between 20,000 and 30,000 companies in the United States have contracts with the
federal government. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1985, at Al, col. 6. Thus a large number of
businesses in the State of Indiana have federal contracts. Moreover, some businesses which do
not have a federal contract, do have a contract with- the State of Indiana or with a local
government in the state.
19. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(g) (1985).
20. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-10 (Supp. 1985).
21. See infra note 88.
22. See infra notes 36-60 and accompanying text.
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and timetables for the employment of minorities and women as a subterfuge
for quotas. 2 Consequently, the Administration has proposed changing the
regulations under the Order, 24 or, in the alternative, repealing the Order
entirely. 25 If either of these proposals become a reality, the state and local
laws will take on added significance to state and local contractors previously
subject to the requirements of Executive Order 11,246 by virtue of a federal
contract.
II. EXECUTVE ORDER 11,246 AND THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Most businesses that have contracts with the federal government must
comply with the requirements of Executive Order 11,246.26 A federal con-
tractor must not only refrain from discriminating on the basis of race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin,27 but must also take affirmative action to
ensure equal employment opportunity.28 The regulations which implement
the affirmative action component of the Order are committed to "result-
oriented procedures" to which a contractor must commit itself to apply
"every good-faith effort." 29 These procedures specifically require the gov-
ernment contractor to submit a detailed affirmative action program. 0 The
affirmative action program must include a breakdown of the contractor's
labor pool by race and sex alongside a similar breakdown of the contractor's
work force.3 ' When the contractor finds areas in which it is deficient in the
utilization of minorities or women,32 the contractor's program must establish
goals and timetables to which it must direct its good faith efforts to correct
the deficiencies. 33 The use of the goals and timetables, however, is not to
23. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1985, at Al, col. 6 (the Reagan Administration believes that
the regulations are responsible for converting the concept of affirmative action into a "eu-
phemism for quotas"); see also infra note 37.
24. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,968 (1981) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pts. 60-1, 60-2, 60-4, 60-20,
60-30, 60-50, 60-60, 60-250, and 60-741) (proposed Aug. 25, 1981); 47 Fed. Reg. 17,770 (1982)
(to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pts. 60-1, 60-2, 60-4, and 60-30) (proposed Apr. 23, 1982).
25. Proposed Changes in Affirmative Action Executive Order, EMPL. PRAc. GurDm (CCH)
5010 (Aug. 15, 1985).
26. Most contracts and subcontracts which do not exceed $10,000 are exempt from the
equal opportunity requirements of the Executive Order. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5 (1985).
27. Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 202(l), 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1964-65 Comp.), reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
28. Id.
29. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1985).
30. Id. §§ 60-2.10 to -2.26. Only contractors with 50 or more employees and a contract of
$50,000 or more need to submit a written affirmative action program. Id. § 60-2.1.
31. Id. § 60-2.11. The availability of minorities and women in the contractor's work force
is a function of the factors specifically outlined in the regulations. See id. §§ 60-2.1 l(b)(1) to
-2.11 (b)(2).
32. The regulations define underutilization as "having fewer minorities or women in a
particular job group than would reasonably be expected by their availability." Id. § 60-2.11 (b).
33. Id. § 60-2.12(g).
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be "rigid and inflexible"-a contractor can explain its failure to meet a
goal.3 4 In fact, the regulations specifically state that the contractor is not to
use the goal to discriminate."
The Reagan Administration argues that despite the regulations which allow
the contractor to show cause why it cannot meet a goal,3 6 as a practical
matter the goals become quotas.3 7 The Administration contends that federal
contractors take the path of least resistance under the result-oriented ap-
proach of the Executive Order by treating the goals as quotas.38 This rigid
approach to the goals both avoids the expense and inconvenience to the
contractor which can accompany the failure to meet a goal3 9 and also acts
to protect the contractor from lawsuits charging discrimination. 40 The Admin-
istration concludes that because of this practical result, the requirements of
34. Id. §§ 60-2.12(e), 60-2.2(c)(1). A contractor can also explain its failure to establish a
goal. Id. § 60-2.12(k).
35. Id. § 60-2.30.
36. When a contractor fails to meet the goals and timetables of its affirmative action
program, it has 30 days to "show cause" why enforcement proceedings should not be instituted.
Id. § 60-2.2(c)(1). If the contractor fails to negotiate an adjustment in the goal to bring it into
compliance, id. § 60-2.2(3), the Office of the Federal Contract Compliance Programs can bring
enforcement proceedings seeking appropriate sanctions. Id. § 60-1.26(2). One possible sanction
is the cancellation of the government contract. Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 209(a)(5), 3 C.F.R.
339, 343-44 (1964-65 Comp.), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
37. The press has asked President Reagan: "Why is your Administration so bent on wiping
out the flexible hiring goals for blacks, minorities and women?" The President responded:
"We have seen in administering these programs ... that the affirmative action program was
becoming a quota system." In response to a follow-up question, the President added: "We
find down there at the bureaucracy level and out there actually in personnel offices ... they
chose the easy course, set down a system of numbers and say, we'll go by that." N.Y. Times,
Feb. 12, 1986, at 10, col. I (national ed.). See also id., at 11, col. 1.
38. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1986, at 10, col. 1 (national ed.). The Justice Department has
released documents, consisting of agreements and correspondence between construction com-
panies and the Labor Department, which it claims are evidence that federal contractors "had
been required to meet rigid quotas in hiring women and members of minority groups." See
id., Mar. 29, 1986, at 1, col. 5 (national ed.)
39. See Comment, Executive Order No. 11,246: Presidential Power to Regulate Employment
Discrimination, 43 Mo. L. Rav. 451, 466 (1978). If the contractor fails to meet a goal, it must
"show cause" why enforcement proceedings should not be instituted. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.2(c)(1)
(1985). If the contractor fails to establish a goal to remedy underutilization, it must analyze
all of the utlization factors in the regulations and detail its reasons for failing to set a goal.
Id. § 60-2.12(k). See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 6 (White House officials
contend that the Executive Order places costly compliance burdens on employers).
40. Contractors that take action pursuant to an affirmative action plan approved under
Executive Order 11,246, will not be held liable under Title VII. Affirmative Action, EEOC
COMPL. MAN. (BNA) No. 43 at §§ 607.6-607.7: 0013-0017 (1982). But see Sisco v. J.S. Alberici
Co., 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982), where the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that a contractor can only prevail in a Title VII suit by raising its
affirmative action plan as an affirmative defense when the contractor's actions are consistent
with the affirmative action guidelines for Title VII outlined by the Supreme Court. Id. at 149.
See also infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
A new Executive Order would allow the voluntary use of goals and timetables as long as
there was no discrimination against white males. This would leave open the possibility of
employment discrimination suits by white males. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
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Executive Order 11,246 are inconsistent with Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19644' and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 42 Moreover,
this practical result is at odds with the Reagan Administration's view that
employment decisions must be color-blind and gender-neutral.4 3
The Administration believes that the requirements of Executive Order
11,246 are inconsistent with Title VII since they require the contractor to
give preferential treatment on the basis of race or sex to correct imbalances
that may exist in its workforce." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
makes employment discrimination unlawful,45 and most federal contractors
are subject to the requirements of both Title VII and Executive Order
11,246.6 The extent of affirmative action available under Title VII, however,
is limited. Title VII specifically states that the Act does not require an
employer to grant preferential treatment to an individual because of race or
sex on account of racial or sexual imbalances which may exist in comparing
the employer's work force to the available labor pool.47
The courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
have outlined three areas in which affirmative action is compatible with Title
VII. First, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,4" the Supreme Court held that
employment standards, such as written tests or height and weight require-
ments, that have a discriminatory impact violate Title VII unless the employer
demonstrates that the standards bear a relationship to "job performance. '49
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
42. The fifth amendment incorporates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and applies it to the federal government. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Technically, the equal protection clause does not apply to private employers, but rather only
to state actors. The Supreme Court has held that government contracting is state action. Reitman
v. Mulkey, 365 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 367 U.S. 715 (1961);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Cf. Comment, supra note 39, at 480 n.161 (sufficient
state action would not be found in merely doing business with a contractor that discriminates).
See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1985, at A20, col. 3 ("Attorney General Edwin Meese
3d says the Constitution is 'color blind,' that 'public policy must be racially neutral,' that'race-
conscious' remedies are illegal and that 'counting by race is a form of racism.' "); N.Y. Times,
Sept. 18, 1985, at A16, col. 4 ("Passage of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to the
Constitution, which guaranteed certain rights regardless of skin color, made the Constitution
'officially colorblind,' [Attorney General] Meese said in arguing that the Administration merely
sought to uphold the Constitution.").
44. The Administration often refers to the remarks of Senator Hubert Humphrey during
the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1986, at 10, col. 1
(national ed.); N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1985, at A20, col. 3. Senator Humphrey stated: "The
proponents of the bill have carefully stated on numerous occasions that Title VII does not
require an employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his work force by giving preferential
treatment to any individual or group." 110 CONG. REc. 12,723 (1964).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
46. Under Title VII, a covered employer is "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees .... " Id. § 2000e(b).
47. Id. § 2000e-20).
48. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
49. Id. at 43 1.
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Under Griggs, the employer must take affirmative action to ensure that
employment standards that are not job related have no adverse effect on
minorities. This is apparently the only mandatory affirmative action under
Title VII. The Supreme Court has held, however, that an employer's vol-
untary affirmative action efforts are permissible under Title VII in limited
circumstances. In United States Steelworkers of America v. Weber,"° the
Court stated that a private employer's affirmative action plan to remedy past
discrimination does not violate Title VII as long as it does not last longer
than necessary, unduly interfere with the interests of non-minorities, require
the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black em-
ployees, or absolutely bar the advancement of white individuals.5' Finally,
the EEOC has issued regulations under Title VII which allow voluntary
affirmative action through training programs and recruiting activity when
discrimination has artificially limited the labor pool.52
Of course, the affirmative action that the federal government requires of
its contractors under Executive Order 11,246 goes beyond the affirmative
action which the government requires of employers under Title VII.53 This
is, in effect, the condition that the business must fulfill to get and keep the
government contract. But to the extent the contractor treats the goals of its
affirmative action program as quotas-by, for example, discharging a white
worker and replacing him with a new black employee, merely to satisfy its
affirmative action goal-it violates Title VII as the statute was interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Weber.
Also, when the contractor treats goals as quotas, the contractor is not
only acting inconsistently with Title VII, but is also at odds with the equal
50. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
51. Id. at 208-09.
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3(c) (1985).
53. To comply with the regulations which the government has issued pursuant to Executive
Order 11,246, federal government contractors must make substantial affirmative action efforts.
See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text. These efforts have resulted in a significant
increase in contractor employment of women ad minorities. A recent Department of Labor
study measured the employment of minorities and women in both contractor and noncontractor
establishments. The study shows that federal contractors had from 1974 to 1980 a greater
comparable growth rate in the percentage of jobs held by minorities and women than did those
firms that did not have a government contract and were therefore only subject to the require-
ments of Title VII. Though overall employment by federal contractors increased by only 3.0%,
minority employment in these firms grew by 20.10. Over the same period, employers having
no federal contract had total employment increase by 8.2% while minority employment rose
by only 12.3%. A similar pattern appears in the hiring of women over this period. Federal
contractors increased their employment of women by 15.2%, while employment of women by
noncontractors grew by only 2.2%. Finally, the study shows that minorities and women em-
ployed by federal contractors are well represented in skilled and white collar occupations whereas
in noncontractor establishments they are overrepresented in unskilled worker and clerical po-
sitions. Labor Study Details Progress of Minorities and Women in Contractor and Noncontractor
Establishments, OF-ca oF FED. CoNT. COMPL., FED. CoTrr. CompL. MAN. (CCH) 21,217 (June
1984).
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protection clause of the United States Constitution. In Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke,54 the Supreme Court held that the use of
quotas by a university in its admissions program constituted reverse discrim-
ination, a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
In addition to these two legal arguments, the Reagan Administration
advocates the social policy of a color-blind society." In such a society,
employment decisions cannot be race-conscious or sex-conscious.1 The Re-
agan Administration therefore only approves of affirmative action which
takes the form of training and recruiting programs. 57
The Administration has considered a number of measures to implement
its view of the proper role for affirmative action. The Administration first
offered new regulations for the Executive Order that would narrow its coverage. 8
More recently the Administration has suggested repealing the Order entirely. 9
54. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke the Supreme Court invalidated a university's special
admissions program which set a specific number of admissions slots aside for disadvantaged
minority applicants. The Court, while setting this system aside as unconstitutional, allowed the
university to take race into account as one in a number of relevant factors in an admissions
decision.
55. See supra note 43.
56. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1985, at A20, col. 3.
57. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1985, § 4, at 4, col. 1.
58. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,968 (1981) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pts. 60-1, 60-2, 60-4, 60-20,
60-30, 60-50, 60-60, 60-250, and 60-741) (proposed Aug. 25, 1981); 47 Fed. Reg. 17,770 (1982)
(to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pts. 60-1, 60-2, 60-4, and 60-30) (proposed Apr. 23, 1982). Among
other things, these regulations would exempt many small contractors from the regulations,
restrict the contractor's total work force to the geographic area in which the contractor is
performing the government work, and change the definition of underutilization to a rate that
is less than 80% of the current availability of minorities or women in the relevant labor pool.
59. The Draft Executive Order states in part:
Subpart F-Affirmative Recruitment and Training Programs Required Pursuant to
Regulations of the Secretary; Preferential Treatment Neither Required nor Given a
Legal Basis by This Executive Order
Sec. 216.-Each Government contractor and subcontractor shall engage in af-
firmative recruitment and employment-related training programs designed to en-
sure that minorities and women receive full consideration for hiring and promotion.
Such affirmative programs shall be developed pursuant to regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of Labor, and shall describe the actions to be taken, including
timeframes for taking such actions, to accomplish the objective of expanding the
number of qualified minorities and women who receive full consideration for
hiring and promotion.
Sec. 217.-Nothing in this Executive Order shall be interpreted to require or to
provide a legal basis for a Government contractor or subcontractor to utilize any
numerical quota, goal, or ratio, or otherwise to discriminate against, or grant any
preference to, any individual or group on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin with respect to any aspect of employment including but not
limited to recruitment, hiring, promotion, upgrading, demotion, transfer, layoff,
termination, rates of pay or other forms of compensation, and selection for
training, including apprenticeship. Nor shall any government contractor or sub-
[Vol. 61:793
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These proposals have caused a great deal of debate.6"
In the meantime, the Justice Department has already taken some steps to
implement the new approach to affirmative action. The Department has
sought modification of consent decrees which give preferential treatment to
persons who were not actual victims of discrimination. 6' This action is based
on the Supreme Court's decision in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts.62 In Stotts, black firefighters and the City of Memphis had entered
a consent decree which established long term goals to remedy past discrim-
inatory hiring and promotion practices. 63 In 1981, however, Memphis had
to lay off some firefighters because of budgetary cutbacks.6 Since the consent
decree had no provisions covering layoffs, a federal district court issued an
injunction restraining the city from using a last-hired, first-fired seniority
layoff system which would decrease the percentage of black firefighters .6
The Supreme Court held that the injunction was improper. 6
The Justice Department has interpreted language in the Stotts opinion as
holding that preferential treatment is not a proper remedial measure for
contractor be determined to have violated this Order due to a failure to adopt
or attain any statistical measures....
Sec. 2.-(a) The Secretary of Labor shall immediately revoke all regulations
and guidelines promulgated pursuant to Executive Order No. 11246 inconsistent
with this Order in that they require or provide a legal basis for a Government
contractor or subcontractor to use numerical quotas, goals, ratios or objectives,
or otherwise to discriminate....
Proposed Changes in Affirmative Action Executive Order, EMPL. PRAc. GumE (CCH) 5010
(Aug. 15, 1985) (emphasis added).
Presidential aides have also presented three options to the President for changing the
Executive Order: (I) to issue a new Executive Order that would allow the voluntary use of
goals and timetables, but would leave open the possibility of job discrimination suits by white
males; (2) to revise the regulations under Executive Order 11,246 to prohibit the mandatory
use of quotas; and (3) to issue a new Executive Order that would prohibit the use of quotas
and make no mention of goals and timetables. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
60. The debate within the Administration is between Attorney General Edwin Meese, with
support from his Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights William Bradford Reynolds, who
favors repealing the Order, and Labor Secretary William Brock, who favors keeping the system
intact. N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1985, at B4, col. 2. Industry is also split on the issue. The
National Association of Manufacturers is in favor of retaining the present Order, while the
United States Chamber of Commerce and the Associated General Contractors of America are
for its repeal. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1986, at 1, col. 4 (national ed.) (the split in
industry is between large businesses which "have the staff and the industrial relations people
to fill out all that paperwork," and the small businesses which object to "what they say are
burdensome regulations.").
61. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1985, § 4, at 4, col. 1.
62. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
63. Id. at 2581.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2582.
66. Id. at 2585.
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those who are not actual victims of discrimination. 67 If the Justice Depart-
ment carries this interpretation to its extreme, any government-sanctioned
remedy which required preferential treatment to correct racial imbalances in
the work force would be inconsistent with Title VII (including the Executive
Order). Most courts, however, have interpreted the Stotts decision much
more narrowly.
68
Despite the holdings of these courts, the Reagan Administration is com-
mitted to implementing a new policy of affirmative action which emphasizes
recruitment and de-emphasizes broad remedial measures. The Executive Or-
der as it now exists is in jeopardy of extinction. A radical change in the
Executive Order will decentralize authority over government contractors and
subject many businesses to various and conflicting state and local laws.
III. THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OBLIGATIONS OF STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS IN INDIANA
A business with a government contract in Indiana may be subject to state
or local laws regarding the employment of women and minorities. The
governmental unit may simply require the contractor to include an antidis-
crimination clause in the contract, 69 or, as under Executive Order 11,246, it
may be necessary for the contractor to establish goals and timetables for
the utilization of minorities and women. 70
67. The Justice Department's argument is that:
In Stotts 'there was no finding that any of the blacks protected from layoff had
been a victim of discrimination' [104 S. Ct. at 2588]. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court determined that 'the Court of Appeals [in affirming the District Court
injunction] imposed on the parties as an adjunct of settlement something (i.e., a
layoff quota) that could not have been ordered had the case gone to trial and
the plaintiffs proved that a pattern or practice of discrimination existed' (1d. at 2588-
89).
Memorandum of the United States in Support of Motion for Prospective Modification of
Consent Decrees at 7-8, United States v. City of Indianapolis, No. 78-388-C (S.D. Ind. filed
Apr. 19, 1985). See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1985, at A20, col. 3 (Assistant Attorney General
William Bradford Reynolds interprets the Stotts decision as precluding persons who are not
actual victims of discrimination from receiving preferential treatment as a part of any remedial
measures).
68. See, e.g., Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1528 (lth Cir. 1985) (Stotts is distin-
guishable because the order involves "promotion not layoffs pursuant to a bona fide seniority
system"); EEOC v. Local 638 Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172, 1186 (2d Cir.
1985) (Stotts is distinguishable since the remedies at issue were not in direct conflict with a
bona fide seniority plan), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985); Krommick v. School District,
739 F.2d 894, 911 (3d Cir. 1984) (Stotts is distinguishable since there is "no override of a bona
fide seniority plan"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers
Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1194, 1202 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (Stotts is distinguishable since there is
intentional discrimination).
69. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-9-1-10 (Supp. 1985); COLUMBUS, IND., Crrv CODE § 12-4
(1973).
70. See CONTRACT COMPLIANCE REGULATIONS OF THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, Rule 4 (1985).
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In Indiana, every contract to which the state or any of its political or
civil subdivisions is a party must contain a provision requiring:
the contractor and his subcontractor not to discriminate against any
employee or applicant for employment, to be employed in the perform-
ance of such contract, with respect to his hire, tenure, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment, because of race, religion, color, sex, hand-
icap, national origin, or ancestry. 71
Breach of this clause may be considered a material breach of the contract. 72
This nondiscrimination commitment of Indiana contractors differs from
the requirements of the Executive Order in several respects. Most impor-
tantly, unlike federal contractors which must comply with the affirmative
action component of the Executive Order, businesses with state contracts
need not submit any affirmative action plan at all. 73 The contractor does
not have to analyze the relevant labor market and establish goals and time-
tables for the utlization of minorities and women. The contractor is not
even required to take affirmative action in recruiting and training minorities
and women. Furthermore, even the nondiscrimination commitment of In-
diana contractors is weaker than the antidiscrimination component of the
Executive Order. Contractors who are subject to the regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Executive Order must meet the obligations for all of their
operations, even those not connected with the government contract work
"during the performance of the contract." 74 In Indiana, however, the con-
tractor must only refrain from discriminating against employees "to be
employed in the performance of such contract. '75
In contrast to the Indiana requirements, a local government may have
equal employment laws which are more extensive. The Indiana Civil Rights
Act states that its policy is to "provide all of its citizens equal opportunity
for... employment... and to eliminate segregation or separation based solely
71. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-10 (Supp. 1985).
72. Id.
73. The use of government contracts to prohibit employment discrimination dates back to
an Executive Order issued by Franklin Roosevelt in 1941, Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957
(1938-43 Comp.); the affirmative action component was not added for twenty years. Exec.
Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-63 Comp.). Some commentators have argued that since
this affirmative action component was first implemented, regulations and subsequent orders
have shifted the emphasis of the component from equal opportunity to equal result. See, e.g.,
N. GLAZER, ApmiuATIVE DISCRIIATION 45-49 (1975); Murray, Affirmative Racism, New
Republic, Dec. 31, 1984, at 18, 19.
For a detailed history of the Executive Orders see Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor,
442 F.2d 159, 168-71 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971), and Comment, supra
note 39, at 476-77.
74. Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 202, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1964-65 Comp.), reprinted as amended
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). A previous Executive Order had required only that the contractor
fulfill the equal employment obligations "in connection with the performance of work under
[the] contract." Exec. Order No. 10,925 § 301, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-63 Comp.).
75. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-10 (Supp. 1985).
1986]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
on race, religion, color, sex, handicap, national origin or ancestry, since
such segregation is an impediment to equal opportunity. '76 The Indiana
legislature has further provided that a city, town, or county can enact
ordiances "to effectuate within its territorial jurisdiction the [civil rights]
policy of the state. '77 Pursuant to this provision, some local governments
in Indiana have enacted ordinances covering local government contractors. 78
Bloomington, Indiana, for example, has established a Human Rights Com-
mission to enforce civil rights within its jurisdiction. 79 The city has enacted
an ordinance which delineates the specific powers and duties of the Com-
mission.80 One section of this ordinance requires that:
All contractors doing business with the City . . shall take affirmative
action to insure that applicants are employed and employees are treated
during employment in a manner which provides equal employment op-
portunity and tends to eliminate inequality based on religion, race, color,
sex, national ancestry and handicap. 81
The ordinance defines affirmative action as statements of policy regarding
equal employment opportunity, recruitment in the minority community, and
active efforts to review the qualifications of all applicants regardless of race,
religion, color, sex, national origin, ancestry or handicap. 2 Furthermore,
the contractor must submit to the Human Rights Commission a written
proposal stating the affirmative action it plans to take.83 The Human Rights
Commission has the power to issue regulations to implement the objectives
of the ordinance,8 4 and the Commission's Contract Compliance Regulations
specifically define the contours of an acceptable affirmative action plan. 85
Under these regulations, the contractor's affirmative action plan must de-
scribe "in detail the good faith efforts they intend to make, as well as the
efforts they have already made to comply with the 'Equal Opportunity'
provision of the contract, including but not limited to goals and timetables
regarding any future affirmative action."8 6 The affirmative action proposal
of a contractor must be approved before the contractor can enter into a con-
tract with the city.87
76. Id. § 22-9-1-2(a).
77. Id. § 22-9-1-12.1.
78. See infra notes 88-89.
79. BLOOMINGTON, IND., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2.21.010 (1983).
80. Id. § 2.21.070.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 2.21.060.
85. See CONTRACT COMPLIANCE REGULATIONS OF THE BLOOMINGTON HUMAN RIGHTS COM-
MISSION, Rule 4 (1985).
86. Id. § 4.1(B).
87. Id.
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Other municipalities, like Bloomington, have ordinances which require the
local govenrnment contractor to implement the government's equal employ-
ment policy."8 On the other hand, some local governments have a Human
Rights Commission with only the authority to hear complaints of discrim-
ination.8 9 Finally, some local governments have no explicit policy on equal
employment opportunity at all.
The Associated Sign & Post case illustrated the potential impact of these
local frameworks. 9° The decision revealed that a municipality can reject the
low bid for a government contract solely on account of the failure of a
bidder to submit an adequate affirmative action plan. 9' Therefore local
governments can provide the incentive for affirmative action that the Reagan
Administration is trying to take away by changing Executive Order 11,246.
As under the Executive Order, a local government may require the contractor
to establish goals and timetables for the utilization of minorities. The Bloom-
ington Human Rights Commission has done this;92 moreover, it has succeeded
in rejecting the bid of a government contractor that failed to submit a plan
that conformed to the Commission's ideal of affirmative action.
93
IV. STATE AND LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN A
"COLOR-BLIND" AND "GENDER-NEUTRAL" SOCIETY
The Reagan Administration is committed to an ideal of affirmative action
in which employment decisions are color-blind and gender-neutral. 94 Con-
sequently, the Administration has sought to substitute recruiting and training
efforts for goals and quotas. 9 The Administration feels that goals and quotas
not only lead to reverse discrimination against white males,96 but also deny
blacks and women the right to compete for jobs equally.9 7
88. See, e.g., COLUMBUS, IND., CITY CODE § 12-4 (1973); FORT WAYNE, IND., CITY CODE
§ 15-17(b) (1979); INDIANAPOUS AND MARION COUNTY, IND., CODE § 16-2 (1984); SOUTH BEND,
IND., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2-132 (1976) (all require clauses in the contract which state that the
contractor will not discriminate in connection with performance of the contract work).
89. See, e.g., LAFAYETTE, IND., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 32.068 (1982); MUNCIE, IND., CODE
OF ORDINANCES, § 34.34 (1969); WEST LAFAYE rE, IND., CITY CODE, § 2-35 (1979).
90. In re Associated Sign & Post, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. App. 1985).
91. Id. at 924-25.
92. See CONTRACT COMPLIANCE REGULATIONS OF THE BLOOMINGTON HUMAN RIGHTS COM-
MISSION, Rule 4 (1985).
93. 485 N.E.2d 917.
94. See supra note 43.
95. See, e.g., Proposed Change in Affirmative Action Executive Order, EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH) 5010 (Aug. 15, 1985); N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1985, § 4, at 4, col. 1.
96. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1985, at 1, col. 6 ("White House officials contend that the
existing rules have ... encouraged employers to discriminate against white men").
97. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at A16, col. 3 (Attorney General Edwin Meese has
stated that "[t]he person preferentially selected by means of race or gender classification suffers
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The equal opportunity policies in Indiana for government contractors are
inconsistent with the Reagan Administration's policy of affirmative action.
The state and some municipalities do not require businesses with government
contracts to go far enough in their equal employment efforts, while at the
same time some local goverments may require its contractors to go too far
in trying to achieve equal employment by requiring the contractor to take
affirmative action in the form of goals and timetables.
Businesses which have contracts with the State of Indiana are only required
to include a clause in the contract which states that it will not discriminate
in employment in performance of the particular state contract work.98 This
clause will not guarantee that the contractor will not make race-conscious
or sex-conscious decisions in other aspects of its business. As a condition
to the award of the government contract the state could require the employer
to refrain from discrimination in all of its operations during performance
of the contract work. 99 The state might also require the government con-
tractor to engage in recruiting and training activity designed to provide equal
employment opportunity regardless of race or sex.1°° Finally, the state could
provide that the violation of a nondiscrimination clause is not only a material
breach of contract,'0' but also disqualifies the business from any future state
contracts for a certain period of time.102
A local affirmative action framework, such as the one enacted in Bloom-
ington, however, may go too far in its affirmative action provisions and
contain many of the same problems that the Reagan Administration contends
make Executive Order 11,246 bad law. Bloomington's affirmative action
scheme on its face calls for "active efforts to review the qualifications of
all applicants regardless of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, ancestry,
or handicap."'0 3 In fact, it contains regulations which require the contractor
to submit an affirmative action plan that establishes goals and timetables
for the employment of minorities and women.'° Furthermore, in Associated
no less indignity than the person excluded because of those classifications.").
Charles Murray suggests that the preferential treatment of blacks may in fact be detrimental
to their interest because it perpetuates an "impression of inferiority." Murray supra note 73,
at 23. The black academic community is also split on the merits of preferential treatment for
blacks. Glenn C. Loury of Harvard argues that in the long run preferential policies do more
harm to blacks than good, while Bernard C. Anderson of Princeton contends that the gov-
ernment has a continuing responsibility to use all necessary measures to ensure equal opportunity.
N.Y. Times, July 25, 1985, at A16, col. 4.
98. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-10 (Supp. 1985).
99. See Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 202, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1964-65 Comp.), reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
100. See supra note 59, § 216 of the Draft Executive Order.
101. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-10 (Supp. 1985).
102. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246 § 209(a)(6), 3 C.F.R. 339, 343-44 (1964-65 Comp.),
reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
103. BLOOMINGTON, IND., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2.21.070 (1983).
104. See CONTRACT COMPLIANCE REGULATIONS OF THE BLOOMINGTON HUMAN RIGHTS COM-
MISSION, Rule 4 (1985).
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Sign & Post, the court held that a local government in Indiana has great
discretion to reject a bid because of an inadequate affirmative action plan. 0 5
Thus, a framework such as that in force in Bloomington cannot help but
lead to the sort of race-conscious and sex-conscious decision-making that
the Reagan Administration is trying to eliminate from Executive Order 11,246.
Like the Executive Order, such a system can be potentially inconsistent with
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'06 and the United States Consti-
tution, '07 not to mention the Indiana Civil Rights Act'08 and the Indiana
Constitution. 09
CONCLUSION
The Reagan Administration is in the process of changing the system of
incentives and punishments that influence the federal government contractor
in its equal employment efforts. The Indiana state government and local
governments in the state should consider changes in their procurement proc-
esses which will be consistent with this new system. The government contract
can be an effective carrot, and governments should use this incentive to
require contractors to make color-blind and gender-neutral employment de-
cisions in all aspects of their businesses. On the other hand, if the government
contract instead is used as an incentive to establish race-conscious and sex-
conscious goals and timetables, in the final analysis, the carrot may prove
rotten and the mule may go astray.*
J. ADn BAIN
105. In re Associated Sign & Post, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 917, 923-24 (Ind. App. 1985).
106. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
108. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (Supp. 1985) (prohibiting discriminatory practices).
109. The Indiana Constitution provides that "[t]he General Assembly shall not grant to any
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not
equally belong to all citizens." IND. CONST. art. I, § 23. The Indiana Supreme Court has stated
that the rights intended to be protected by this section are identical to the rights protected
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Haas v. South Bend
Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 526, 289 N.E.2d 495, 501 (1972).
* Since this Comment went to press the Supreme Court has issued rulings in three affirmative
action cases which may have an effect on the Reagan Administration's plans to change the
affirmative action requirements of Executive Order 11,246. In Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
54 U.S.L.W. 4464 (May 19, 1986), the Court held that the Constitution required a showing greater
than societal discrimination to justify an affirmative action plan that preferred blacks in layoff
decisions. In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 54 U.S.L.W. 4984 (July
2, 1986), and Local No. 98, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 54 U.S.L.W. 5005 (July 2,
1986), the Court, in upholding two affirmative action hiring plans, rejected the Justice Depart-
ment's argument that preferential treatment for those who are not actual victims of discrimina-
tion is inconsistent with Title VII.
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